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NOTE
The Seat Belt Defense and North Carolina's New Mandatory
Usage Law
In Miller v. Miller,' decided in 1968, the North Carolina Supreme Court
rejected the seat belt defense,2 which precludes a plaintiff in an automobile per-
sonal injury action from recovering fully for his or her injuries because of failure
to use an available seat belt. 3 Basing its decision in part on the conclusion that
there is no duty to "buckle up,"4 the court indicated that any decision to link the
use of seat belts to a standard of reasonable care should be left to the general
assembly.5 The courts of several other states reached similar conclusions, 6 but
most state legislatures declined to consider the issue.7 The United States De-
partment of Transportation's (DOT's) recent enactment of the Occupant Crash
1. 273 N.C. 228, 160 S.E.2d 65 (1968).
2. One student commentator has written:
The so-called "seat belt defense" relieves the negligent defendant in an automobile
injury case from liability for those injuries to the plaintiff which would not have occurred
had plaintiff used an available seat belt. Thus, where a passenger is thrown against the
windshield and injured in the accident, he may not recover for those injuries if the defend-
ant shows by expert testimony that use of a seat belt would have prevented the passenger
from hitting the windshield.
Note, The Seat Belt Defense A Comprehensive Guide for the Trial Lawyer and Suggested Approach
for the Courts, 56 NOTRE DAME LAW. 272, 272 n.1 (1980).
3. Although Miller has been used to support complete preclusion of the seat belt defense, the
court's language seems to indicate that there could be limited exceptional circumstances in which the
wearing of a seat belt would be required as an exercise of reasonable care. Justice Sharp stated:
Conceivably a situation could arise in which a plaintiff's failure to have his seat belt buck-
led at the time he was injured would constitute negligence. It would, however, have to be a
situation in which the plaintiff, with prior knowledge of a specific hazard-one not gener-
ally associated with highway travel and one from which a seat belt would have protected
him-had failed or refused to fasten his seat belt.
Miller, 273 N.C. at 234, 160 S.E.2d at 70.
4. The court concluded that there was no statutory duty to use seat belts. It interpreted N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 20-135.2 (1961) as requiring the installation of belts on only a limited number of
vehicles. Miller, 273 N.C. at 230-31, 160 S.E.2d at 68. Also, the court found that there was no
common-law duty to use seat belts because there was no standard by which to judge whether a
reasonably prudent person would wear a seat belt on one trip but not another. Id. at 234-35, 160
S.E.2d at 71.
5. Miller, 273 N.C. at 238, 160 S.E.2d at 73.
6. Opinions stating that the standard should be set by the legislature include Brodvin v. Hertz
Corp., 487 F. Supp. 1336 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); Lipscomb v. Diamiani, 226 A.2d 914 (Del. Super. Ct.
1967); Wagner v. Zboncak, 111 Ill. App. 3d 268, 443 N.E.2d 1085 (1982); Old Second Nat'l Bank v.
Baumann, 86 I1. App. 3d 547, 408 N.E.2d 224 (1980); State v. Ingram, 427 N.E.2d 444 (Ind. 1981);
Schmitzer v. Misener-Bennett Ford, Inc., 135 Mich. App. 350, 354 N.W.2d 336 (1984);
Romankewiz v. Black, 16 Mich. App. 119, 167 N.W.2d 606 (1969); Miller v. Haynes, 454 S.W.2d
293 (Mo. App. 1970); Barry v. Coca Cola Co., 99 N.J. Super. 270, 239 A.2d 273 (Law Div. 1967);
Selgado v. Commercial Warehouse Co., 88 N.M. 579, 544 P.2d 719 (1975); and Fields v. Volk-
swagen of Am., 555 P.2d 48 (Okla. 1980).
7. Only five legislatures had addressed this issue before the Department of Transportation
enacted the Occupant Crash Protection Rule. Each of these states enacted legislation barring use of
the seat belt defense. See IowA CODE § 321.445 (1985); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 29, § 1368A
(1978); MINN. STAT. § 169.685 (Supp. 1986); TENN. CODE ANN. § 55-9-214 (1980); VA. CODE
§ 46.1-309.1 (1980).
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Protection Rule,8 however, has forced state legislatures to consider the issue. In
addition to requiring motorists to use seat belts, the seat belt usage laws enacted
pursuant to the Occupant Crash Protection Rule must permit use of the seat belt
defense. 9
In May 1985, in response to the DOT regulation and the related extensive
lobbying efforts of the American automotive industry, 10 North Carolina joined
fourteen other states that statutorily require motorists to use seat belts.*' "An
Act to Make the Use of Seat Belts in Motor Vehicles Mandatory"' 12 requires
drivers of motor vehicles and all front seat passengers to have a "safety belt
properly fastened about [the] body at all times when the vehicle is in forward
motion on a street or highway in the state." 13 The Act, however, departs from
8. 49 C.F.R. § 571.208 (1985). The federal rule, entitled "Occupant crash protection," re-
quires that all American-made cars be equipped with automatic crash protection devices unless
states accounting for at least two-thirds of the country's population pass mandatory seat belt usage
laws before April 1, 1989. The automatic restraint system will be phased in between September 1986
and September 1989. Id.
Equipment to be installed may include "air bags that inflate on collision to cushion occupants,
seat belts that automatically wrap around occupants when the door is closed, or any other system
that permits passengers to survive a 30 mile-per-hour crash." 15 States Have Enacted Mandatory
Seat Belt Laws, 61 J. AM. INS. 29, 31-32 (1985) [hereinafter cited as 15 States]; see also Closing the
Gap: Are Seatbelt Laws Closer to Reality?, 61 J. AM. INS. 14 (1985) (discussing the provisions of the
new regulation and the public policy behind its implementation) [hereinafter cited as Closing the
Gap]; Middle Lane: Bags, Belts-and a Loophole, TIME, July 23, 1984, at 47 (discussing the specif-
ics of the regulation and emphasizing that the automobile industry will probably not have to install
the new safety equipment) [hereinafter cited as Middle Lane].
9. In 49 C.F.R. § 571.208 S4.1.5.2 (1985) the DOT outlined the minimum criteria for state
mandatory safety belt usage laws. The DOT requires provisions in the state laws specifying that
the violation of the belt usage requirement may be used to mitigate damages with respect to
any person who is involved in a passenger car accident while violating the belt usage re-
quirement and who seeks in any subsequent litigation to recover damages for injuries re-
sulting from the accident. This requirement is satisfied if there is a rule in the law in the
State permitting such mitigation.
Id. § 571.208 $4.1.5.2(c)(2).
10. See Compromise on Seat Belt Bill OK'd by Panel, News & Observer (Raleigh, N.C.), Apr.
10, 1985, at IA, col. 5.
When announcing the new federal rule, Transportation Secretary Elizabeth Dole explained that
the government would launch a $40 million annual campaign, half funded by the auto industry, to
promote mandatory seat belt legislation. Middle Lane, supra note 8, at 47. Auto companies have
expressed concern over the cost of installing air bags, which they estimate to be about $800 per car.
Id. One state senator in North Carolina has stated that the auto industry is spending $12 to $15
million on behalf of mandatory seat belt legislation in targeted states. He also stated that the auto
companies "have [put] out a newsletter and have hired the most well known and influential lobbyists
in the state." Right to Risk? Personal Freedom Seen as Major Issue in Debate on Seat Belt Legisla-
tion, The Raleigh Times, Mar. 25, 1985, at IA, col. 4 (quoting Senator Wendell Sawyer, R.-Guilford
Co.) [hereinafter cited as Right to Risk?].
11. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 14-100a (West Supp. 1986); 1985 Hawaii Sess. Laws 235 (to
be codified at HAWAII REV. STAT. § 291); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 32.295.1 (West Supp. 1986);
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 9.2410(5) (West Supp. 1986); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 307.178 (Vernon
Supp. 1986); NEB. REV. STAT. § 39-6,103.04 (Supp. 1985); NEV. REV. STAT. § 484.641 (1985) (ef-
fective only if the DOT allows the state to impose a maximum speed limit of at least 70 miles per
hour)); N.J. REV. STAT. § 39.3-76.2f(Supp. 1986); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 66-7-37 (Supp. 1986)); N.Y.
VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 1229-c (McKinney Supp. 1986)); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 47, § 12-417 (West
Supp. 1985); TEX. HIGH CODE ANN. § 6701d (Vernon Supp. 1986). These states contain 40.1% of
the Nation's population. 15 States, supra note 8, at 29.
12. Act of May 23, 1985, ch. 222, 1985 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. 76 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 20-135.2A (Supp. 1985)).
13. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-135.2A (Supp. 1985). The law specifies that the driver is responsible
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the DOT regulation by expressly precluding the use of the seat belt defense in
North Carolina courts.
14
The new DOT regulation reflects the growing public concern for highway
safety. This Note explores the considerations underlying the DOT's conclusion
that by enacting mandatory usage laws and by requiring that state courts recog-
nize the seat belt defense in personal injury cases, the number of highway deaths
each year could be substantially reduced. The Note also reviews the debate con-
cerning the use of the seat belt defense as an incentive for Americans to make
use of these safety devices, and it evaluates the responses of state legislatures
throughout the country to the DOT's mandate that states recognize the defense.
After analyzing the new North Carolina legislation, this Note concludes that by
precluding use of the seat belt defense, the North Carolina General Assembly
has not only failed to comply with the guidelines set by the DOT, but also has
neglected to take advantage of an important opportunity to make North Caro-
lina's highways safer.
More than 44,000 drivers and passengers are killed in motor vehicle acci-
dents each year, and another 500,000 receive moderate to severe injuries.15
for making sure that those passengers under 16 years of age are properly buckled up. Id. § 20-
135.2A(a).
14. The Act provides:
Failure to wear a safety belt in violation of this section shall not constitute negligence 6r
contributory negligence in any action for the recovery of damages arising out of the opera-
tion, ownership or maintenance of a motor vehicle, nor shall anything in this act change
any existing law, rule or procedure pertaining to any such civil action.
Id. § 20-135.2A(d).
The North Carolina General Assembly addressed the conflict between the Act's provisions and
the DOT regulations by stating:
This Act shall cease to be effective if, and upon such date as, a final determination by
lawful authority is made that the North Carolina law on mandatory seat belt usage does
not meet the minimum criteria established by the United States Department of Transporta-
tion for State mandatory safety belt usage laws necessary to rescind the federal rule requir-
ing automobile manufacturers to phase in automatic occupant restraints in automobiles.
Act of May 23, 1985, ch. 222, § 2, 1985 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. 76, 77.
The Act also provides broad exemptions from the requirement that seat belts be used:
This section shall not apply to any of the following:
(1) A driver or occupant with a medical or physical condition that prevents appropri-
ate restraint by a safety belt or with a professionally certified mental phobia against the
wearing of vehicle restraints;
(2) a motor vehicle operated by a rural letter carrier of the United States Postal Ser-
vice while performing duties as a rural letter carrier;
(3) a driver or passenger frequently stopping and leaving the vehicle or delivering
property from the vehicle if the speed of the vehicle between stops does not exceed 20 miles
per hour;
(4) any vehicle registered and licensed as a property-carrying vehicle in accordance
with G.S. 20-88, while being used for agricultural or commercial purposes; or
(5) a motor vehicle not required to be equipped with safety belts under the federal
law.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-135.2A(c) (Supp. 1985).
The Act provides for a $25 fine for any violation of the law after December 31, 1986. Betieen
October 1, 1985, and December 31, 1986, any person violating the section shall only receive a warn-
ing. Also, violation of the law cannot result in the assessment of drivers' license points or an insur-
ance surcharge. Id. § 20-135.2A(e).
15. Note, Insurance Co. of North America v. Pasakarnis: Florida's Reasonably Prudent Motor-
ists No Longer Can "Afford" Not to Buckle Up, 36 MERCER L. REv. 1041, 1058 n.160 (1985) (citing
19861 1129
1130 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 64
DOT estimates that the economic loss to society from motor vehicle crashes is
$57 billion annually. 16 Increases in the number of highway fatalities and severe
injuries have raised the cost of insurance and medical care. 17 Because of these
alarming facts, many researchers and commentators have declared that traffic
safety is a compelling national interest. They urge that the states as well as the
federal government assume responsibility for stopping the needless waste of
human life and national economic resources. 18
Traffic safety researchers in the United States and in other countries have
repeatedly expressed a belief that the public should be provided with every in-
centive to make use of seat belts. For many years researchers have known that
seat belts are highly effective in preventing death and serious injury to passenger
car occupants. 19 Although seat belts do not provide absolute protection from
injury, they can reduce the risk significantly. 20 The results of studies vary, but
the consensus is that seat belts could prevent nearly one-half of all highway
fatalities.21 Seat belts prevent car occupants from striking objects inside the
car's interior, such as the windshield or the steering wheel.22 More importantly,
U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSPORTATION, PROGRESS AND ASSESSMENT REPORT ON THE NATIONAL
SAFETY BELT USAGE PROGRAM (1983)).
16. Comment, The Seat Belt Defense-A Valid Instrument of Public Policy, 44 TENN. L. REV.
119, 128-29 (1976). Not only are there the direct costs of accidents, such as the cost of the police,
fire department and ambulance services, but the economic loss also includes medical costs, insurance
and legal expenses, and lost production time. 15 States, supra note 8, at 32. Cost estimates are made
by the DOT using a scale developed by the National Safety Council, which allows $210,000 per
fatality, $18,200 per incapacitating injury, $5,500 per evident injury, and $1,300 per possible injury.
NAT'L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSPORTATION, TRAFFIC SAFETY
NEWSLETTER 2 (Dec. 1984) (available at the Highway Safety Research Center, University of North
Carolina at Chapel Hill); see also Closing the Gap, supra note 8, at 16 (Almost 50% of brain damage
and spinal cord injuries resulting in disability occur in auto accidents. By some estimates care for
one victim of a spinal cord injury costs over $155,000 for the first year alone. A brain damage victim
may require care amounting to $500,000 a year).
17. See, eg., Right to Risk?, supra note 10 (listing North Carolina statistics).
18. See, eg., P. WALLER, L. LI, B. CAMPBELL & M. HERMAN, SAFETY BELTS: THE UNCOL-
LECTED DIVIDENDS (Highway Safety Research Center, University of North Carolina at Chapel
Hill, May 1977) (issued as part of a coordinated statewide safety belt utilization encouragement
campaign). The American Automobile Association recently published a brochure aimed at convinc-
ing state legislatures to enact seat belt usage laws. AMERICAN AUTO. AsS'N, STATES SHOULD EN-
ACT SAFETY BELT USE LAWS (1985) (available at the Highway Safety Research Center, University
of North Carolina at Chapel Hill). The pamphlet begins by stating:
Death by motor vehicle is a national health problem of major significance. It ranks just
behind heart disease, cancer, and stroke as the leading cause of death in our general popu-
lation. It is the leading cause of death for young people ages 1 through 24. It ranks second
only to cancer for adults 25-44.
Id.
19. Campbell, Safety Belt Laws Save Lives in Many Nations But Not in the United States, 1984
TRAVEL MED. INT'L 258, 258.
20. AMERICAN AUTOMOBILE ASs'N, supra note 18 (wearing seat belt during collision reduces
chance of serious injury by 50% and chance of death by 45%).
21. Id.; see also Closing the Gap, supra note 8, at 16 (estimating that use of lap belts would
reduce fatal accidents by 30-40%; use of lap and shoulder belts would reduce fatal accidents by 40-
55%).
22. Injury sustained in this manner is commonly referred to as the "second impact injury."
Researchers claim that this part of an accident produces the more serious injuries. P. WALLER, L,
Li, B. CAMPBELL & M. HERMAN, supra note 18, at 1-2 to 1-5.
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seat belts keep passengers inside the car.23 A belted driver is more likely to
remain conscious and in a position to control the vehicle after a collision.24 In
view of the relatively low cost of seat belts compared to the price of automatic
passive restraints such as air bags, their high level of effectiveness, 25 and their
general availability,26 seat belts are estimated to be the single most cost effective
means of reducing highway deaths.27
In the mid-1950s, Ford Motor Company launched a national highway
safety campaign that included encouraging the installation of lap belts in all
American-made cars: 28 In 1958 the National Safety Council, in conjunction
with the American Medical Association and the United States Health Service,
embarked upon an expansive public education program called "Operation Seat
Belt.' '2 9 By 1966 lap belts for both front and rear seats had become standard
equipment in all new cars produced by United States manufacturers. 30 In 1962
New York passed the first state legislation requiring the installation of lap belts
in all new cars in that state.31 Today, all fifty states have legislation requiring
the installation of seat belts and in some instances prescribing safety standards
applicable to seat belts.32 Since 1968 federal law has required installation of
23. Being thrown from a car increases the chance of death or serious injury by 250%. Id. at 1-
2.
For a more comprehensive list of relevant statistics, see Tourin, Ejection and Automobile Fatali-
ties, 73 U.S. PUB. HEALTH REP. 381 (1968). This study is reproduced as an appendix to the opinion
in Bentzler v. Braun, 34 Wis. 2d 362, 149 N.W.2d 626 (1967). A common concern is that a belt may
jam and a driver may be trapped inside a burning or submerged vehicle. Most researchers have been
quick to point out that such accidents are unusual. Another study cited by the Bentzler court indi-
cated that fire occurs in only 0.2% of all injury-producing accidents. See Gage, Seat Belts: No
Longer Why But Why Not?, TODAY'S HEALTH, July 1960, at 26.
24. See Closing the Gap, supra note 8, at 17 (belted driver is therefore less likely to contribute to
severity of accidents).
25. At least one study has denied the effectiveness of seat belts, stating that their use actually
encourages bad driving. J. ADAMS, THE EFFICACY OF SEAT BELT LEGISLATION: A COMPARATIVE
STUDY OF ROAD ACCIDENT FATALITY STATISTICS FROM 18 COUNTRIES (Occasional Papers # 38,
Dep't of Geography, Univ. College of London 1981) (available at the Highway Safety Research
Center, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill). But see Hamer, Do Compulsory Seat Belt
Laws Save Lives?, 89 NEw SCIENTIST 461 (1981) (author rebuts Adams' arguments and states that
high risk drivers, upon whom Adams' study is based, are unlikely to be affected by usage laws
because they will habitually violate them).
26. See Comment, supra note 16, at 127-28 (seatbelts are available in almost every car) (citing
NAT'L SAFETY COUNCIL, ACCIDENT FACTS 52 (1975)).
27. See Campbell, supra note 19, at 259. The NAT'L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN.,
U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSPORTATION, TRAFFIC SAFETY NEWSLETTER 2 (July 1984), reports a National
Highway Traffic Safety Administration study of the effectiveness of employer-sponsored seat belt use
programs in reducing the costs of automobile accidents. Costs to employers resulting from accidents
in which employees did not wear seat belts were found to be as high as $86,795 per accident. The
use of seat belts by employees reduced some employer costs to zero, and in no case in which seat
belts were used did the costs exceed $200.
28. Note, Seat Belt Defense-Whether They Know It or Not, Florida Motorist Must "Buckle
Up" or Risk Loss of Full Recovery-Insurance Co. of North America v. Pasakarnis, 451 So. 2d 447
(Fla. 1984), 12 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 669, 670 (1985).
29. Note, Oklahoma and the Seat Belt Defense: Should Fields be Reconsidered?, 10 OKLA.
CITY U.L. REV. 153, 156 (1985).
30. Id. at 157.
31. Id.; see N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 383 (McKinney 1970).
32. Note, supra note 29, at 157 n.17 (complete listing of state statutes requiring the installation
of seat belts).
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both lap belts and shoulder harnesses in all cars sold in the United States.33
Despite widespread public awareness of the effectiveness of seat belts, vol-
untary usage rates remain low; only an estimated thirteen percent of Americans
use seat belts.3 4 A public opinion survey conducted in New York immediately
before mandatory seat belt legislation was passed showed that the main reason
New Yorkers did not "always" wear their seat belts was not because they did
not believe in their effectiveness, but because they were "too lazy" and "care-
less," or because they thought of the belts as a "nuisance."3 5 In the same sur-
vey, seventy-seven percent of those answering stated that they would favor
legislation mandating the use of seat belts.3 6
Public reluctance to use seat belts led to the DOT ruling giving automobile
manufacturers ten years in which to make passive restraints available in all do-
mestic autos. In enacting the new Occupant Crash Protection Rule, the DOT
stated:
Automatic occupant protection systems that do not totally rely upon
belts, such as airbags or passive interiors, offer significant additional
potential for preventing fatalities and injuries, at least in part because
the American public is likely to find them less intrusive; their develop-
ment and availability should be encouraged through appropriate
incentives.3 7
The installation of passive restraints, however, would not be a panacea.
Although they would be more convenient for the American public and would
offer additional protection to motorists, the DOT has reported that airbags alone
are insufficient protection in many crash situations, such as those occurring at
speeds of greater than ten to twelve miles per hour, rollovers, or rear end colli-
sions.38 Other governmental studies show that the most effective restraint sys-
tem would include both air bags and lap/shoulder belts.3 9 Because of the debate
over the economic feasibility of installing passive restraints in all cars40 and be-
cause most cars are already equipped with seat belts, the DOT deemed
mandatory seat belt usage laws a viable interim solution.41 Thus, manufacturers
will be allowed additional time to test the reliability and marketability of air
bags, and motorists will be protected by the most effective means of protection
now available, at no extra cost.
33. 23 C.F.R. § 225.21 (1968).
34. Middle Lane, supra note 8, at 47.
35. Belt Tightening: A Sign of the Times, 6 AM. ASS'N AuTo. MED. Q.J. 7, 9 (1984) [hereinaf-
ter cited as Belt Tightening].
36. Id.
37. Id. at 10.
38. Closing the Gap, supra note 8, at 17.
39. Id. (deaths and serious injuries could be reduced by 45-60% if all three devices were used).
40. The automotive industry is concerned about the cost of installing passive restraint systems
in accordance with the DOT's ruling. DOT Secretary Dole estimates that air bags would cost $320 a
car, but auto makers place the cost at $800 a car. Middle Lane, supra note 8, at 47. Chysler Chair-
man Lee Iacocca stresses that 100 million American cars are already equipped with the best safety
device, the lap and shoulder belt, and the Chairman of American Motors believes that the 1987
model-year deadline for passive restraints is unrealistic. Id.
41. Closing the Gap, supra note 8, at 15.
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In its regulation, the DOT specified the criteria for state mandatory usage
laws that would suspend enforcement of the passive restraints rule.42 These
guidelines require that courts be permitted to reduce the damages allowed to a
plaintiff who has failed to wear a seat belt. The regulation does not mandate
reduction in all cases; rather, its purpose is to allow courts to weigh the evidence
and circumstances to determine whether the jury should be allowed to consider
reducing the plaintiff's recovery.43 Thus, the DOT urged the adoption of the
seat belt defense in conjunction with mandatory seat belt use laws.
Long before the DOT joined the battle, defense attorneys had been urging
state courts to adopt the seat belt defense, arguing that state statutes requiring
the installation of seat belts implied the existence of a corresponding duty to use
seat belts.44 Defense lawyers argued that in automobile personal injury cases,
plaintiffs who failed to wear available seat belts should be held negligent per se
and should be denied any recovery.45 Nearly all courts, however, rejected this
per se negligence theory as "harsh and unsound." 46 Many courts have noted
that statutes requiring the installation of seat belts exempt a large number of
vehicles.47 Further, courts frequently have observed that if legislators had
meant to require seat belt use, they could have done so explicitly. 48 Without
such a clear legislative mandate, courts have declined to impose a per se negli-
gence standard upon plaintiffs who fail to use available seat belts.
49
42. See 49 C.F.R. § 571.208 S4.1.5.2 (1985).
43. See supra note 9.
44. The seat belt defense was first applied in the unreported trial court decision of Stockinger v.
Dunisch (Sheboygan County, Wisc. Cir. Ct. 1964), which is discussed in Defense Dicta, 5 FOR THE
DEFENSE 79 (1964); see also Note, supra note 2, at 272 n.2 (discussing the origins of the defense).
The trial judge in Stockinger concluded that a statute requiring the installation of seat belts showed a
legislative intent that these restraints be used. See Note, supra note 29, at 161.
45. Note, supra note 28, at 670; see also Donelson, Non-Use ofAutomobile Safety Belts in Civil
Litigation, 9 TRAF. LAW COMMENTARY 1 (Nat'l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., U.S. Dep't of
Transportation Feb. 1980) (discussing different theories of tort liability presented by defense attor-
neys in support of seat belt defense). For more complete information concerning the history of the
use of the seat belt defense, see Kischer, The Seat Belt Defense-State of the Law, 53 MARQ. L. REV.
172 (1970); Kleist, The Seat Belt Defense-An Exercise in Sophistry, 18 HASTINGS L.J. 613 (1967);
Note, supra note 15; Note, Buckling Up For Safety: Should Florida Reconsider the Seat Belt De-
fense?, 13 STETSON L. REv. 160 (1984); Note, Seat Belt Negligence in Automobile Accidents, 1967
Wis. L. REv. 288 [hereinafter cited as Note, Seat Belt Negligence].
46. Miller, 273 N.C. at 237, 160 S.E.2d at 73. For other decisions rejecting a per se negligence
theory, see Robinson v. Bone, 285 F. Supp. 423 (D. Or. 1968); Brown v. Kendrick, 192 So. 2d 49
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1966); Hansen v. Howard 0. Miller, Inc., 93 Idaho 314, 460 P.2d 739 (1969);
Cierpisz v. Singleton, 247 Md. 215, 230 A.2d 629 (1967); Schmitzer v. Misener-Bennett Ford, Inc.,
135 Mich. App. 350, 354 N.W.2d 336 (1984); Romankewiz v. Black, 16 Mich. App. 119, 167
N.W.2d 606 (1969); Miller v. Haynes, 454 S.W.2d 293 (Mo. Ct. App. 1970); Barry v. Coca Cola Co.,
99 N.J. Super. 270, 239 A.2d 273 (Law Div. 1967); Spier v. Barker, 35 N.Y.2d 444, 323 N.E.2d 164,
363 N.Y.S.2d 916 (1974); Fields v. Volkswagen of Am., 555 P.2d 48 (Okla. 1976); Amend v. Bell, 89
Wash. 2d 124, 570 P.2d 138 (1977); and Bentzler v. Braun, 34 Wis. 2d 362, 149 N.W.2d 626 (1967).
47. See, e.g., Miller, 273 N.C. at 231, 160 S.E.2d at 68 (noting the North Carolina General
Assembly's failure to require the installation of seat belts in all licensed passenger vehicles and
buses).
48. See, eg., Cierpisz v. Singleton, 247 Md. 215, 222, 230 A.2d 629, 633 (1967) (noting that no
state statute at that time required the use of seat belts); Barry v. Coca Cola Co., 99 N.J. Super. 270,
279, 239 A.2d 273, 278 (Law Div. 1967) (pointing out that legislature had studied the question of
safety devices carefully and decided to require only the installation of seat belts).
49. See, eg., Miller, 273 N.C. at 231, 160 S.E.2d at 68.
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Unable to find a statutory duty to buckle up, many courts have also held
that the common-law reasonable person standard does not require a motorist to
wear a seat belt. 0 These decisions focus on the lack of a causal connection
between the failure to wear a seat belt and the injury-causing accident. By di-
minishing a plaintiff's recovery for failure to wear a seat belt, a court would be
punishing that plaintiff for behavior which in no way caused the accident. Ar-
guably, the doctrine of contributory negligence should apply only when the
plaintiff's failure to adhere to a recognized standard of care proximately caused
the accident in whole or in part.5 1 The failure to use a seat belt may enhance a
plaintiff's injury, but, except in rare circumstances, 52 it does not cause the acci-
dent itself. The North Carolina Supreme Court's decision in Miller53 is fre-
quently cited as support for the proposition that there is no common-law duty to
wear a seat belt.5 4 In holding that plaintiff's failure to wear a seat belt was not
contributory negligence and that the doctrine of avoidable consequences5 5 was
not relevant, the court concluded that absent a statutorily defined standard of
care there is no way to determine whether the use of seat belts is reasonable for
one trip but not for another.5 6
The courts of other states have also outlined basic objections to the imposi-
tion of a common-law duty to wear seat belts. In Amend v. Bell 57 the Supreme
Court of Washington observed:
50. For decisions other than Miller in which courts rejected the imposition of a common-law
duty to wear seat belts, see Nash v. Kamrath, 21 Ariz. App. 530, 521 P.2d 161 (1974); Fischer v.
Moore, 183 Colo. 392, 517 P.2d 458 (1973); Hotchkiss v. Preble, 33 Colo. App. 431, 521 P.2d 1278
(1974); Lipscombe v. Diamiami, 226 A.2d 914 (Del. Super. Ct. 1967); MeCord v. Green, 362 A.2d
720 (D.C. 1976); Clarkson v. Wright, 108 Ill. 2d 129, 483 N.E.2d 268 (1985); Schmitzer v. Misener-
Bennett Ford, Inc., 135 Mich. App. 350, 354 N.W.2d 336 (1984); Romankewiz v. Black, 16 Mich.
App. 119, 167 N.W.2d 606 (1969); Miller v. Haynes, 454 S.W.2d 293 (Mo. Ct. App. 1970); and
Wong v. Carnation Co., 509 S.W.2d 385 (Tex. Civ. App.), aff'd 516 S.W.2d 116 (rex. 1974).
51. See Miller, 273 N.C. at 237, 160 S.E.2d at 73. This reasoning is apparent in the decisions
cited supra in note 50.
52. See, eg., Temple v. Giacco, 37 Conn. Supp. 120, 442 A.2d 947 (Super. Ct. 1981). In Tem-
ple plaintiff passenger fell out the door of a moving vehicle while the driver was making a turn.
Defendants claimed they warned plaintiff not to lean against the passenger door. Id. at 122, 442
A.2d at 948.
53. 273 N.C. at 228, 160 S.E.2d at 65.
54. See, eg., cases cited supra note 50.
55. The Miller court noted:
The rule in North Carolina is that an injured plaintiff, whether his case be tort or contract,
must exercise reasonable care and diligence to avoid or lessen the consequences of the
defendant's wrong. If he fails to do so, for any part of the loss incident to such failure, no
recovery can be had. This rule is known as the doctrine of avoidable consequences.
Miller, 273 N.C. at 239, 160 S.E.2d at 73-74. This doctrine only reduces the amount of damages
recoverable; it does not bar recovery. The court stated that this doctrine is not relevant to the seat
belt situation because a plaintiff's failure to "avoid consequences" takes place after an accident, but
the failure to buckle a seat belt occurs before the defendant's negligence and before the plaintiff is
injured. Id. at 239, 160 S.E.2d at 74. For a discussion of the distinctions between contributory
negligence and the doctrine of avoidable consequences, see W. PROSSER & P. KEETON, THE LAW Or
TORTS § 65, at 458-59 (P. Keeton 5th ed. 1984). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS,
§ 465 comment c (1957) (discussing the concept of apportioning damages between separate harms
even when one such cause only contributes to increasing the severity of the damages rather than
causing the harm itself; eg., failure to wear a seat belt only increases the harm that results from an
accident-it does not cause the accident itself).
56. Miller, 273 N.C. at 234-35, 160 S.E.2d at 71.
57. 89 Wash. 2d 124, 570 P.2d 138 (1977).
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The defendant should not [be allowed to] diminish the conse-
quences of his negligence by the failure of the plaintiff to anticipate the
defendant's negligence in causing the accident itself. Only if plaintiff
should have so anticipated the accident can it be said that plaintiff had
a duty to fasten the seat belt prior to the accident. 58
Noting that most motorists do not use seat belts, that seat belts are not required
in all vehicles, and that use of a seat belt could aggravate a motorist's injury in
some situations, the Amend court concluded that a defendant "should not be
entitled to take advantage of the fortuitous circumstance that plaintiff was riding
in a car so equipped." 59 In Lipscomb v. Diamiani60 the Delaware Superior
Court articulated another concern prevalent in decisions rejecting the seat belt
defense, noting that "it is extremely difficult to analyze the variables presented in
failing to buckle a seat belt upon entering an automobile for normal, everyday
driving. To ask the jury to do so is to invite verdicts on prejudice and sympathy
contrary to the law." 61
Despite the majority view that there is no common-law duty to buckle up,
the Wisconsin Supreme Court in Bentzler v. Braun62 reasoned that because "it is
obvious that, on the average, persons using seat belts are less likely to sustain
injury and, if injured, the injuries are likely to be less serious,"' 6 3 occupants of
automobiles either know or should know of the additional safety factors result-
ing from the use of seat belts. Thus, the court concluded that an automobile
passenger has a duty to exercise reasonable care to avoid injury and that the
failure to use an available seat belt may constitute a failure to exercise such
reasonable care.64
Although a majority of courts considering the issue has found neither a
statutory nor a common-law duty to wear seat belts, a substantial number of
courts has accepted the seat belt defense for the sole purpose of mitigating dam-
ages.65 Under this approach, a defendant may contend that a plaintiff who
failed to use an available seat belt should not be allowed to recover for those
injuries that the defendant can prove would not have occurred had the plaintiff
worn a seat belt.66 One commentator has stated that by allowing evidence to be
presented under a mitigation of damages theory, the courts have effected a type
of" 'compromise solution between the harshness of totally barring the injured
58. Id. at 132, 570 P.2d at 143.
59. Id.
60. 226 A.2d 914 (Del. Super. Ct. 1967).
61. Id. at 917.
62. 34 Wis. 2d 362, 149 N.W.2d 626 (1967).
63. Id. at 386, 149 N.W.2d at 640. In making this observation, the court referred to an article
by the American Trial Lawyers Association entitled Stop Murder By Motor, ATLA MONOGRAPH 9
(Jan. 1965), in which it was stated that "[flull installation and use of seat belts could reduce deaths
by 5,000 annually and serious injuries by one-third." See also Note, Seat Belt Negligence, supra note
45, at 292 (compilation of statistics demonstrating the effectiveness of seat belts in preventing
injuries).
64. Bentzler, 34 Wis. 2d at 375, 149 N.W.2d at 640; see also Sams v. Sams, 247 S.C. 467, 148
S.E.2d 154 (1966) (jury may find duty to wear seat belts under some circumstances).
65. For an extensive listing of decisions in which courts have allowed evidence of nonuse of seat
belts to be presented under a theory of mitigation of damages, see Note, supra note 2, at 272 n.4.
66. See Note, supra note 29, at 163.
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occupant's recovery and, on the other hand, enabling the occupant to disregard
a proven safety device which may significantly reduce the likelihood of ejection
[from the automobile] and prevent' second collision injuries."'67
Although still not accepted by a majority of courts,68 the use of the seat belt
defense to mitigate damages has proven to be a flexible means of ensuring that
the "law remains both fair and realistic as society and technology change."' 69 A
1974 New York Supreme Court decision has become the leading case advocating
this use of the seat belt defense. In Spier v. Barker7° the court ruled that a
defendant asserting the seat belt defense must prove by competent evidence that
the plaintiff could have avoided injury by wearing a seat belt. Responding to
criticism that the use of the seat belt defense to mitigate damages conflicts with
the traditional tort law concept that a duty to mitigate arises only after the plain-
tiff has been injured,7 1 the Spier court stated:
We concede that the opportunity to mitigate damages prior to the oc-
currence of an accident does not ordinarily arise, and that the chrono-
logical distinction, on which the concept of mitigation damages rests,
is justified in most cases. However, in our opinion, the seat belt affords
the automobile occupant an unusual and ordinarily available means by
which he or she may minimize his or her damages prior to the
accident. 72
The Spier decision indicates that early in the history of the seat belt defense
some courts had already realized the effectiveness of seat belts. The New York
court recognized that highway safety had become a national concern and that
requiring an automobile occupant to use a selt belt or risk losing part of his or
her recovery was not an unduly harsh policy. 73 The New Mexico Court of Ap-
peals, in Thomas v. Henson,74 reflected the same attitude when it stated:
In the past the appellate courts of this state have not shied away
from their continuing responsibility to ensure that the law remains fair
and realistic as changes occur. In an area of the law peculiarly appro-
priate for judicial development, we have no hesitation in extending a
67. Id. (quoting Annot., 80 A.L.R.3D 1033, 1038 (1977)).
68. Five states have rejected the mitigation of damages theory by statute. See supra note 7. For
a comprehensive list of decisions rejecting the mitigation theory, see Note, supra note 2, at 272 n.5.
Fifteen states-Alaska, Arkansas, Georgia, Hawaii, Kentucky, Massachusetts, Nebraska, Ne-
vada, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Utah, Vermont, West Virginia, and Wyo-
ming-have no reported decisions on the mitigation issue. See Note, supra note 2, at 272 n.10. Of
those decisions rejecting the mitigation theory, only 12 have been from a state's highest court. Note,
supra note 29, at 164 (The Illinois Supreme Court recently rejected the defense, and two other state
supreme court decisions on the issue were not definitive). In Fischer v. Moore, 183 Colo. 392, 517
P.2d 458 (1973), the Colorado Supreme Court indicated in dicta that the seat belt defense may be
allowed under a comparative negligence system. In Boutwell Butane Co. v. Smith, 244 So. 2d I 1
(Miss. 1971), the Mississippi Supreme Court held only that there was insufficient evidence to send
the issue to the jury under the facts of the case.
69. Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Pasakarnis, 451 So. 2d 447, 451 (Fla. 1984).
70. 35 N.Y.2d 444, 323 N.E.2d 164, 363 N.Y.S.2d 916 (1974).
71. See supra note 55. Decisions rejecting the mitigation theory reflect this concern.
72. Spier, 35 N.Y.2d at 452-53, 323 N.E.2d at 169, 363 N.Y.S.2d at 922.
73. Id.
74. 102 N.M. 417, 696 P.2d 1010 (N.M. App. 1984).
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common law duty when deemed needed. Tort law is such an area.75
More recently, the Florida Supreme Court, in overturning an appellate
court's rejection of the seat belt defense, agreed with the Spier rationale and
stated that it was the responsibility of the judiciary to protect people against
risks they cannot or do not adequately guard against.76 In Insurance Co. of
North America v. Pasakarnis77 the court stated that seat belts have been shown
to afford occupants of automobiles a means by which injuries may be minimized
in the event of a collision. Because the public is aware of the large number of
automobile accidents that occur each year, the court reasoned that such acci-
dents are foreseeable. As a result, automobile occupants have a duty of reason-
able care to protect themselves against the consequences of these foreseeable
accidents.
[T]he failure to expend the minimal effort required to fasten an
available safety device which has been put there specifically in order to
reduce or avoid injuries from a subsequent accident is, on the face of
the matter, obviously pertinent and thus should be deemed admissible
in an action for damages, part of which would not have been sustained
if a seat belt had been used. 78
Like the Spier court, the court in Pasakarnis held that failure to use a seat
belt may constitute a failure to use reasonable care on the part of the plaintiff.
The court placed the burden on the defendant to prove that the plaintiff failed to
use an available seat belt and that there was a causal relationship between the
plaintiff's failure to buckle up and the plaintiff's injuries. 79 Some courts have
concluded that this method of determining the amount by which a plaintiff's
recovery should be reduced would result in sheer speculation by the jury.80
Both the Spier and Pasakarnis courts, however, expressed confidence in the abil-
ity of experts to help the jury and noted that juries are relied on to apportion
damages in other equally complex cases.81
75. Id. at 424, 696 P.2d at 1017.
76. Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Pasakarnis, 451 So. 2d 447, 453 (Fla. 1984), rev'g Lafferty v.
Allstate Ins. Co., 425 So. 2d 1147 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982). For a full discussion of Lafferty, see
Note, supra note 15.
77. 451 So. 2d 447 (Fla. 1984).
78. Id. at 453 (quoting Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Pasakarnis, 425 So. 2d 1141, 1143 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (Schwartz, J., dissenting)).
79. Id. at 454; cf. Mount v. McLellan, 91 111. App. 2d 1, 234 N.E.2d 329 (1968) (although
plaintiff's failure to use seat belt is irrelevant to the issue of liability, jury may consider that fact
when awarding damages); Sams v. Sams, 247 S.C. 467, 148 S.E.2d 154 (1966) (question of causation
should be left to the jury).
80. Most cases rejecting the defense have stated a concern similar to that expressed by Justice
Sharp in Miller. Justice Sharp noted that use of the seat belt defense to mitigate damages would
"'invite verdicts [based] on prejudice and sympathy contrary to the law. . . [create] unnecessary
conflicts in result and. . . degrade the law by reducing it to a game of chance.'" Miller, 273 N.C. at
235, 160 S.E.2d at 71 (quoting Lipscomb v. Diamiani, 226 A.2d 914, 917 (Del. Super. Ct. 1967)).
81. Spier, 35 N.Y.2d at 452-53, 323 N.E.2d at 169, 363 N.Y.S.2d at 922 (referring to the role of
the jury in apportioning damages between a tortfeasor and a negligent treating physician when both
contribute to plaintiff's injuries); Pasakarnis, 451 So. 2d at 454 (authorizing the use of interrogatories
to aid jury in setting damage award).
The seat belt defense has also become an issue in products liability cases. For cases in which the
defense was offered by a manufacturer as a mitigating factor, see Wilson v. Volkswagen of Am., 445
F. Supp. 1368 (E.D. Va. 1978) (fact that driver not wearing seat belt held inadmissible), and Breault
19861 SEAT BELT LAW 1137
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
A common thread running through judicial decisions rejecting the seat belt
defense is that the final determination should be left to the legislature.82 Despite
encouragement from the judiciary and from various safety groups throughout
the country, many state legislatures have refused to consider mandatory seat belt
laws.8 3 It is clear, however, that this reluctance has not been due to a belief that
highway safety legislation is unnecessary. Legislative attempts to reduce high-
way deaths began with the imposition of the fifty-five mile-per-hour speed limit
in 1974.84 More recently, lawmakers have taken a hard stand against drunk
driving,85 and child safety seat laws were passed in forty-nine states in just seven
years.86 Nevertheless, it was not until the DOT addressed the issue of
mandatory restraint systems in 1984 that state legislators began to respond. In
an effort to settle the long debate over the installation of mandatory passive
restraint systems in all American-made cars,87 the DOT promulgated a rule that
allows auto makers to avoid installing such features if states encompassing at
least two-thirds of the Nation's population enact mandatory seat belt laws.88
Studies of countries with mandatory seat belt laws show that enforced
mandatory seat belt legislation has led to an increase in seat belt use and to
significant reductions in traffic fatalities. 89 The Highway Users Foundation con-
cluded that if all fifty states had enforced mandatory seat belt laws, as many as
eighty percent of all citizens would begin wearing seat belts.90 A usage rate this
high could save more than $5.4 billion in costs related to highway accidents each
year.9 1 After closely analyzing these studies, the DOT concluded that "effec-
tively enforced mandatory seat belt laws will provide the greatest safety benefits
most quickly of any other alternatives, with almost no additional costs." 92
Mandatory usage laws have proven effective in other countries. Most of the
motorized world has enacted such legislation, significantly increasing the public
usage rate and reducing traffic fatalities. 93 In some countries, such as Australia
v. Ford Motor Co., 364 Mass. 352, 305 N.E.2d 824 (1973) (leaning towards admissibility). For a
case in which the failure of a plaintiff to wear a seat belt was used to show "product misuse," see
Daly v. General Motor Corp., 20 Cal. 3d 725, 575 P.2d 1162, 144 Cal. Rptr. 380 (1978). See gener-
ally Harris, Enhanced Injury Theory: An Analytic Framework, 62 N.C.L. REV. 643, 677-83 (1984)
(discussing the use of the seat belt defense in products liability situations and advocating a wider
acceptance of the theory by the courts).
82. See Note, supra note 28, at 679. The Delaware Supreme Court stated: "The life and death
area with which we are dealing is perculiarly suited for the legislative exploration and development."
Lipscomb, 226 A.2d at 916.
83. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
84. Closing the Gap, supra note 8, at 16.
85. Id.; see, eg., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20.138.1 (1983) (drunk driving statute).
86. Closing the Gap, supra note 8, at 16.
87. See Middle Lane, supra note 8, at 47.
88. See supra notes 8-19 and accompanying text.
89. See infra notes 93-104 and accompanying text.
90. 15 States, supra note 8, at 32.
91. Id.
92. Belt Tightening, supra note 35, at 12.
93. For general support of this statement, see COMPULSORY WEARING OF SEAT BELTS-THE
AUSTRALIAN EXPERIENCE (A. McLean ed. 1973); F. FISHER, EFFECTIVENESS OF SAFETY BELT
USAGE LAwS 11.9 (1980) (report prepared for the Nat'l Highway Traffic Safety Research Center,
U.S. Dep't of Transportation; available at the Highway Safety Research Center, University of North
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and the United Kingdom, compliance has reached ninety percent. 94 In other
countries, such as Canada, seat belt usage ranges from forty to sixty percent. 95
Studies indicate that increased seat belt use leads to a reduction in the number of
traffic casualties. 9 6 In 1980 the DOT published an exhaustive evaluation of seat
belt use in seventeen nations, including Canada, Australia, and France.97 The
study revealed that the main factor influencing the frequency with which a per-
son wears a seat belt is "the level of enforcement, with high usage rates usually
associated with stringent enforcement. However, in some cases it did appear
that the people's cultural propensities for being highly law abiding obviated the
need for stringent enforcement."98  Most citizens interviewed favored
mandatory seat belt legislation.99 Usage rates were found to rise by as much as
two to three hundred percent immediately after passage of such acts. t10
Because of its geographic proximity to the United States, Canada has been
studied carefully by the DOT.'0 1 In the province of Ontario, seat belt use rose
from twenty-four to seventy-seven percent immediately after mandatory seat
belt legislation was passed.10 2 Fatalities, however, were reduced by only eleven
percent.' 0 3 The comparatively low rate of fatality reduction has been blamed on
the relaxation of enforcement a few months after the legislation was enacted.
Canadian courts, however, have attempted to promote the use of seat belts by
deducting as much as fifteen percent from damage awards if it can be shown that
a plaintiff's injuries were aggravated by a failure to wear a seat belt.1° 4
To date, fifteen states, including North Carolina, have passed mandatory
seat belt use legislation. 105 Five other states and the District of Columbia have
Carolina at Chapel Hill) (contains comprehensive table entitled "Highlights of Belt Usage Around
the World"); 19 Highway Loss Reduction Status Rep. (Ins. Inst. for Highway Safety, Sept. 8, 1984)
(available at the Highway Safety Research Center, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill);
Highway Users Found. & Automotive Safety Found., THE SAFETY BELT PROPONENT'S GUIDE 80
(Apr. 1984) (available at the Highway Safety Research Center, University of North Carolina at
Chapel Hill); S. MANDERS, MOTOR VEHICLE RESTRAINT USE IN VICTORIA 1 (Road Safety & Traf-
fic Auth. 1983); and Belt Tightening, supra note 35, at 12.
94. Campbell, supra note 19, at 259 (citing S. MANDERS, supra note 93); see also Highway
Users Found. & Automotive Safety Found., supra note 93, at 10 (containing relevant statistics from
Australia and the United Kingdom).
95. Campbell, supra note 19, at 259.
96. Id.; see also S. MANDERS, supra note 93, at 9 (95.2% of drivers and 91.1% of passengers
wear seat belts).
97. Department of Transportation Report Underscores Importance of Vigorous Enforcement, 19
HIGHWAY Loss REDUCTION STATUS REP. 9 (Ins. Inst. for Highway Safety, Sept. 8, 1984) (available
at the Highway Safety Research Center, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill) (discussing
Fisher, supra note 93).
98. F. FISHER, supra note 93, at I1.11. The author points out that enforcement ranged from no
punishment in Puerto Rico and Japan to possible imprisonment in Canada, Finland, Belgium and
Australia.
99. Id. Fisher notes that attitudinal studies showed that between 60 and 80% of people inter-
viewed agreed with mandatory seat belt legislation. Id.
100. Id.
101. See, eg., id. (Canada included within study); see also Closing the Gap, supra note 8, at 16
(discussing various studies concerning mandatory legislation in Canada).
102. Closing the Gap, supra note 8, at 16.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 17.
105. See supra notes 11-12.
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similar bills pending.10 6 These statutes require drivers and other front seat oc-
cupants to use seat belts and punish violations with fines ranging from ten to
fifty dollars. 10 7 Each statute also allows exemptions from the seat belt use for a
variety of reasons. Medical exemptions may be granted for conditions ranging
from pregnancy to a "professionally certified mental phobia against the wearing
of vehicle restraints."10 8
The statutes, however, differ in their treatments of the seat belt defense.
The DOT concluded that the mitigation theory is the soundest approach and
included within the Occupant Crash Protection Rule a requirement that state
laws passed in accordance with the regulation allow trial courts to reduce a
plaintiff's damages in civil actions for failure to comply with mandatory seat belt
laws.109 Despite this requirement, eight of these new state laws, including
North Carolina's, specifically mandate that the failure to use seat belts shall not
be utilized as evidence of negligence or as a basis for limiting or apportioning
recoverable damages. 110
The North Carolina General Assembly's decision to disallow the seat belt
defense and to repeal the mandatory seat belt law in its entirety should the DOT
106. As of August 1, 1985, these states were California, Massachusetts, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and
Wisconsin. 15 States, supra note 8, at 31 (chart summarizing seat belt laws and showing that 47
states have considered the issue since the DOT ruling).
107. New York permits the highest fine, allowing courts to impose a maximum fine of $50. 15
States, supra note 8, at 31. Other states have maximum fines of $15, $20, or $25. Id. Nevada
reserved the right to require participation in a work program rather than impose a fine. See NEV.
REv. STAT. § 484.641(3) (1985) (effective only if DOT allows state to impose speed limit of at least
70 miles per hour).
108. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-135.2A (Supp. 1985)); see 15 States, supra note 8, at 31 (chart sum-
marizing all state laws to date).
109. See supra note 9.
110. Along with North Carolina, Connecticut, New Mexico, Illinois, Oklahoma, Texas, Indiana,
and Nevada do not allow evidence of nonuse to be introduced at any civil trial. For statute citations,
see supra note 11.
In Connecticut the legislation changed the common law expressed in Remington v. Arndt, 28
Conn. Super. 289, 259 A.2d 145 (1969), which allowed mitigation. See also Wassell v. Hamblin, 196
Conn. 463, 493 A.2d 870 (1985) (allowing mitigation). The common law was also changed by the
New Mexico mandatory seat belt law. See Thomas v. Henson, 696 P.2d 1010 (N.M. App. 1984)
(allowing seat belt defense); see also Selgado v. Commercial Warehouse, 88 N.M. 579, 544 P.2d 719
(1975) (rejecting seat belt defense and indicating that validity of the defense was an issue for the
legislature). In Illinois a recent supreme court decision, Clarkson v. Wright, 108 IlI. 2d 129, 483
N.E.2d 268 (1985), rejected the defense; therefore, the Illinois statute did not change the common
law. The case law of Oklahoma, Texas, and Indiana was not affected by legislative rejection of the
defense. See State v. Ingram, 427 N.E.2d 444 (Ind. 1981) (rejecting the defense); Fields v. Volk-
swagen of Am., 555 P.2d 48 (Okla. 1976) (rejecting the defense); Carnation Co. v. Wong, 516
S.W.2d 116 (Tex. 1974) (rejecting the defense). Nevada and Hawaii have no case law on the subject,
but Hawaii's statute states that with respect to negligence actions the new regulation should not be
used to change or in any way alter existing case law. Act of June 5, 1985, art. 235, § 1, 1985 Hawaii
Sess. Laws 434, 435. The New Jersey statute is very similar to the Hawaii statute and states that the
common law shall not be altered by the legislation. 1985 N.J. Sess. Law Serv. 179 (West) (to be
codified at N.J. REV. STAT. § 39.3-7b.2). The legislatures of Hawaii and New Jersey have left the
status of the seat belt defense to the judiciary. See also 15 States, supra note 8, at 31 (failure to allow
mitigation, along with the failure of three states (Illinois, Nebraska, and Nevada) to implement
education programs in connection with the new legislation to encourage compliance with the usage
requirement, both of which are criteria specified in the DOTs ruling, may exclude these 11 states
(including Hawaii and New Jersey, which failed to take a stand on the issue) from being included
within the population requirement to keep automatic restraints from being required).
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find it unacceptable'I' appears to be the result of a compromise reached in the
state House and Senate. 1 2 Those opposing the mandatory law argued that the
federal government had encroached upon the personal rights of individuals by
requiring seat belt use. 113 Some representatives contended that the DOT was
"blackmailing" the states into passing the legislation; 114 others resented what
they saw as an infringement upon each adult's freedom of choice.'15 Governor
James Martin articulated this view when he stated, "Informed people can make
informed choices. In my view, it's a personal choice."' 1 6 In addition, some
legislators contended that using seat belts could actually increase the chance of
injury. 117
Faced with such strong opposing views, those legislators supporting the law
believed that inclusion of a provision requiring mitigation of damages in the
courts would seriously jeopardize passage of the bill."Is Many legislators, in-
cluding both proponents and opponents of the law, concluded that compliance
with the federally sanctioned mitigation theory would impose a comparative
negligence system on North Carolina courts.1 19 Proponents of the legislation
succeeded in getting the law passed only by agreeing to exclude the seat belt
defense and by emphasizing the cost effectiveness of seat belts. 120
At first glance, precluding the seat belt defense would not appear to have
much effect on the common law of North Carolina as articulated in Miller, but a
careful reading of that opinion suggests otherwise. Justice Sharp, although re-
jecting use of the seat belt defense under a mitigation theory in traditional tort
law, nervertheless recognized that under certain circumstances the failure to use
a seat belt could be deemed a failure to exercise ordinary care.12 1 The general
11. See supra note 14.
112. See Federal Approval Sought of Seat-Belt Bill, Durham Morning Herald, Apr. 10, 1985, at
1 IA, col. 1 [hereinafter cited as Federal Approval Sought).
113. See Seat Belt Plan to Get Hearing, Chapel Hill News, Mar. 18, 1985, at 6A, col. 5; Seat
Belts and Liberty, News & Observer (Raleigh, N.C.), Mar. 23, 1985 (editorial), at 4A, col. 1; Right to
Risk?, supra note 10.
114. Right to Risk?, supra note 10, at 2A, col. 4.
115. Seat Belt Bill Gets Tenative OK, News & Observer (Raleigh, N.C.), May 17, 1985, at IA,
col. 2.
116. Right to Risk?, supra note 10, at IA, col. 5.
117. See N.C. Seat-Belt Bill "Seems To Be In Some Trouble," Durham Morning Herald, Mar.
27, 1985, at 6A, col. I [hereinafter cited as N.C Seat Belt Bill]. Senator Ollie Harris (D-Cleveland
Co.) stated that he did not want to be responsible for someone's drowning or having his head "ripped
off" because he had on a seat belt. Id. at 6A, col. 6.
118. N.C. Seat-Belt Bill, supra note 117; see also Federal Approval Sought, supra note 112 (senate
approved the bill only after adding § 2, a provision terminating the act if the DOT ruled that it did
not meet the minimum criteria needed to prevent mandatory passive restraints for automobiles).
119. Compromise on Seat Belt Bill OK'd By Panel, News & Observer (Raleigh, N.C.), Apr. 10,
1985, at IA, col. 5 [hereinafter cited as Compromise on Seat Belt Bill].
120. The proponents emphasized the high cost of air bags, the high cost of accidents and deaths,
and the overall effectiveness of seat belts in dealing with these problems. For other arguments in
support of the bill, see Critics Club Seat Belt Bill, Durham Morning Herald, Mar. 8, 1985, at 1A, col.
2; Senate Tentatively OKs Mandatory Seat Belt Use, News & Observer (Raleigh, N.C.), Apr. 17,
1985, at 1A, col. 5. In response to arguments that the bill encroaches on public rights, some repre-
sentatives emphasized that driving is a privilege granted by the state and that regulation of the state
highways is within the province of the legislature. See, eg., Right To Risk?, supra note 10, at Al,
col. 8 (rules of the road always infringe in some way on personal freedoms).
121. Miller, 273 N.C. at 234, 160 S.E.2d at 70; see supra note 3.
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assembly, however, has effectively precluded courts from considering that
issue. 122
Six of the seven other states that have rejected the DOT's mitigation re-
quirement are states in which the courts had previously denied the availability of
the seat belt defense. 123 Thus it appears that these mandatory usage laws had
little effect on the common law of those states. In Connecticut, however, state
courts have always held that although there is no common-law duty to fasten a
seat belt each time one gets into a car, under the right set of circumstances, the
jury may consider a plaintiff's failure to use a seat belt. 124 The Connecticut
General Assembly rejected this approach and dictated that evidence of nonuse
of seat belts should not be admissible under any circumstances. 125
The New York seat belt law, passed early in 1984, closely followed that
state's common law. As stated in Spier v. Barker,126 New York courts may not
consider a plaintiff's failure to use seat belts in determining liability in a civil
action, but they may allow the introduction of such evidence to mitigate dam-
ages.' 2 7 Other states with new legislation have developed compromises on the
mitigation issue. Michigan, Louisiana, and Nebraska have enacted legislation
that allows evidence of the failure to use seat belts to be introduced to mitigate
damages but limits the amount by which a plaintiff's damages may be re-
duced.12 8 This approach complies with DOT mitigation requirements and gives
the states' courts a wide range of discretion in dealing with varied fact situations.
By requiring that mitigation not be completely precluded, the DOT en-
dorsed what it concluded is an effective means of fulfilling the purpose of its new
rule-reduction of the number of traffic deaths and severe injuries to automobile
occupants. 129 Limiting the amount of recovery to a victim who has failed to
wear a seat belt encourages motorists to comply with the new legislation without
being unduly harsh. 1 30 As one supporter of the mitigation theory recently
noted, rather than emphasizing the plaintiff's recovery and the defendant's pun-
ishment, the states and the courts should be concerned with encouraging the use
122. For discussions of circumstances that should encourage courts to reconsider previous rul-
ings against the seat belt defense, see Comment, supra note 16, at 128-29; and Note, supra note 29, at
183-88.
123. In addition to North Carolina, seven other states' laws preclude the use of the seat belt
defense. See supra note 110. Of these eight states, only Connecticut completely changed its common
law. Id.
124. See Wassell v. Hamblin, 196 Conn. 463, 493 A.2d 870 (1985); Tempe v. Giacco, 37 Conn.
Supp. 120, 442 A.2d 947 (Super. Ct. 1981); Remington v. Arndt, 28 Conn. Supp. 289, 259 A.2d 145
(Super. Ct. 1969).
125. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 14-100a (West Supp. 1986).
126. 35 N.Y.2d 44, 323 N.E.2d 164, 363 N.Y.S.2d 916 (1974).
127. See N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 383 (McKinney 1970 & Supp. 1984).
128. In Michigan, for example, evidence of a failure to use safety belts may be considered by a
jury to reduce the plaintiff's recovery, but only by up to five percent. MIcH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 9.4210(5) (West Supp. 1986); see also LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 32.295.1 (West Supp. 1986) (al-
lowing a two percent reduction); NEB. REV. STAT. § 39-6,103.08 (Supp. 1985) (allowing a five per-
cent reduction).
129. See 49 C.F.R. § 571.208 S2 (1985).
130. See Compromise on Seat Belt Bill, supra note 119, at IA, col. 5.
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of a proven method of reducing death and serious injury on the highway. 131
The legislation adopted by Michigan, Louisiana, and Nebraska provides a work-
able means of implementing that idea.
By enacting North Carolina General Statutes section 20-135.2A, the North
Carolina General Assembly took a positive step in dealing with the serious prob-
lem of highway safety. However, it failed to take advantage of an opportunity to
overturn Miller and permit the introduction of evidence of seat belt nonuse as a
mitigating factor in determining recoverable damages. As a result, the DOT
may reject the North Carolina statute, leading to the legislation's complete in-
validation.132 Even if the DOT does not reject the legislation, the North Caro-
lina Supreme Court is effectively barred from reconsidering its decision in Miller
and from allowing the seat belt defense to be used even in extraordinary
circumstances. 13
3
Arguably, the general assembly erred in relying on Miller as a basis for its
rejection of the seat belt defense. Seat belts are now available to almost every
automobile occupant and the American public is quite aware of the effectiveness
of seat belts in saving lives.134 Because of changing public attitudes toward the
use of seat belts, it is arguable that the North Carolina Supreme Court today
might rule differently if faced with the facts of Miller. Use of the seat belt de-
fense as adopted in Spier and as permitted by statute in Michigan, Louisiana,
and Nebraska 135 shows that courts can apply the defense without harsh and
unjust results. Similarly, the defense could be effective within North Carolina's
contributory negligence system. As one commentator has stated: "One of the
underpinnings of tort law is an ability to circumvent the need for categorizing,
with a certain legal theory, a novel situation demanding judicial inquiry. The
uncommon opportunity to prevent or reduce injury which is present in the seat
belt scenario is such a circumstance."' 13 6
The general assembly would have implemented public policy more effec-
tively if it had allowed use of the seat belt defense as a factor in mitigating dam-
ages. At the very least, if the representatives were concerned with the judiciary's
reaction to such a mandate, they could have left the issue open to reconsidera-
tion by the state's courts. By precluding the defense, the general assembly has
failed to provide a strong incentive to wear seat belts. Legislation requiring such
use has proven to be ineffective if not adequately enforced and supported. The
North Carolina General Assembly has a responsibility to the citizens of the State
to implement effective regulations to deal with health and safety problems of this
magnitude and to take advantage of every available opportunity to encourage
public compliance with the laws of the State. Its failure to fulfill this responsibil-
131. Note, supra note 29, at 185, 190.
132. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
133. See supra note 3.
134. See Comment, supra note 16, at 128-29 (setting forth similar argument with respect to
Tennessee statute rejecting the seat belt defense).
135. See supra note 128.
136. Note, supra note 29, at 190.
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ity in its consideration of the seat belt defense may cost some North Carolina
citizens their lives.
CHERYL LYNN DANIELS
